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Abstract: This paper discusses the methodology used to model common cause failures of thrusters on 
the International Space Station (ISS) Visiting Vehicles.  The ISS Visiting Vehicles each have as many 
as 32 thrusters, whose redundancy and similar design make them susceptible to common cause 
failures.  The Global Alpha Model (as described in NUREG/CR-5485) can be used to represent the 
system common cause contribution, but NUREG/CR-5496 supplies global alpha parameters for 
groups only up to size six.  Because of the large number of redundant thrusters on each vehicle, 
regression is used to determine parameter values for groups of size larger than six.  An additional 
challenge is that Visiting Vehicle thruster failures must occur in specific combinations in order to fail 
the propulsion system; not all failure groups of a certain size are critical.   
 
Keywords: PRA, ISS, Common Cause, CCF, Global Alpha Model 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Common Cause Failure (CCF) events are dependent failures of (usually) redundant items not 
otherwise accounted for in a probabilistic risk model.  Common cause failures can be due to many 
factors, including: 
 
 Environmental factors (vibration, thermal stress, humidity, etc.) 
 Manufacturing defects 
 Human error (installation error, improper maintenance, etc.) 
 Design error 
 
A hypothetical ISS Visiting Vehicle propulsion system has 18 thrusters.  The similar redundancy of 
the system makes it susceptible to common cause failures.   
 
A typical common cause model considers a small number of redundant components, say two or three.  
It is reasonable to explicitly model individual common cause events when there are few components in 
a group.  For example, suppose there are three redundant components, A, B, and C, and that failure of 
at least two of the components fails the system.  There are four critical failure combinations of size 
two or more: AB, BC, AC, and ABC.  It is straightforward to model these common cause events 
explicitly.  Now suppose there are 18 redundant components, and that failure of at least four of the 
components fails the system.  In this case there are a total of 261,156 critical combinations of size four 
or more.  It is not reasonable to model this many common cause events explicitly, so a different 
method is needed in order to simplify the model.   
 
The model can be made significantly more concise by lumping all common cause events into a single, 
global value that represents the common cause contribution for the entire system.  One method for 
doing this is the Global Alpha Model, described in NUREG/CR-5485 [1].  An Excel-based tool that 
uses the Global Alpha Model to calculate the common cause contribution of a system with a large 
number of redundant components is the Global Alpha Model Uncertainty Tool (GAMUT), created by 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA).  
The values calculated by GAMUT can be used in a Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on 
Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) [2] fault tree.   
 
An additional challenge with the ISS Visiting Vehicles is that not all thruster failure groups of a 
certain size are critical.  In this example, failure of a certain number of thrusters out of 18 will fail the 
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system only if they occur in specific combinations.  For typical common cause models, where all 
groups of a certain size are critical, GAMUT can calculate the number of groups of a given size that 
would fail the system.  In this case, however, the critical combinations of failures must be calculated 
by hand.  GAMUT then retrieves the common cause parameters for each possible number of failures 
and uses the equations from NUREG/CR-5485 to calculate the global common cause contribution.   
 
GAMUT uses the 2009 update to NUREG/CR-5496 [3] as its source for the mean and uncertainty of 
the global alpha parameters.  NUREG/CR-5496 provides alpha factors for specific component types 
(pumps, valves, etc.) as well as generic values.  Features of the generic values include: 
 
 Different values for demand versus rate 
 Group sizes ranging from two to six 
 Uncertainty parameters 
 
GAMUT contains generic alpha values for groups of size two to 32.  For values less than or equal to 
six, the GAMUT parameters are identical to the generic values from NUREG/CR-5496.  Regression 
was used to determine parameter values for groups of size larger than six.   
 
The example scenarios being considered to illustrate this approach are Abort and Collision.  Each 
scenario has its own defined success criteria and therefore its own global common cause value.   
 
2.  ISS VISITING VEHICLE PROPULSION SYSTEM 
 
2.1.  Failure Rules 
 
In the following configuration, 18 thrusters are arranged in four quadrants.  Note that the configuration 
and failure rules given in Tables 1 and 2 do not reflect the actual configuration and failure rules of any 
of the ISS Visiting Vehicles, but are intended to serve only as an example.   
 
Table 1: Thruster Configuration 
 
Group Name Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
+Roll D1T1 D2T1 D3T1 D4T1 
-Roll D1T2 D2T2 D3T2 D4T2 
Aft (-X) D1T3 D2T3 D3T3 D4T3 
Forward (+X) D1T4 D2T4 D3T4 D4T4 
Forward (+X) D1T5  D3T5  
 
The possible failure scenarios and results are given in the table below. 
 
Table 2: Thruster Failure Rules 
 
Failure Scenario Result 
≥1 thruster failure in a quadrant Quadrant Failure 
2 or 3 quadrant failures Abort 
4 quadrant failures Collision 
 
For example, the set of failures {D1T1, D1T3, D1T4} results in the failure of quadrant 1, but not in 
Abort or Collision.  The set of failures {D2T3, D3T5} results in Abort, and the set of failures {D1T2, 
D2T4, D3T3, D4T1} results in Collision. 
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2.2.  Combinatorial Failure Logic 
 
Let k  equal the number of thruster failures that have occurred.  Clearly, when 1k  , the result would 
be a quadrant failure, but not Abort or Collision.  When 2k  , the result is Abort only if the failures 
occur in different quadrants.  For example, failure of {D1T1, D1T2} does not result in Abort, but 
failure of {D1T1, D2T1} does.  The calculation of the total number of Abort failure groups when 
2k  , 
2
Abortc , can be stated in words as follows.  [Note that in the equations below, the terms 
n
k
 
 
 
 
and 
n
k
 
 
 
 are both equal to 
 
!
! !
n
k n k
, and that the bracket notation is a convention to distinguish 
choosing groups from choosing members in a group.]   
 
Choose both groups of five and choose one member from each group:  
 
2 5 5
25
2 1 1
    
   
    
 
 
Or, choose both groups of four and choose one member from each group: 
 
2 4 4
16
2 1 1
    
   
    
 
 
Or, choose one group of five, one group of four, and one member from each group:  
 
2 2 5 4
80
1 1 1 1
      
     
      
 
 
So, the total number of Abort failure groups when 2k   is: 
 
2
2 5 5 2 4 4 2 2 5 4
121
2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Abortc
             
                  
             
 
 
The minimum number of failures required for Collision is four.  The only way that four failures will 
result in Collision is if there is one failure in each quadrant.  When 4k  , the total number of 
Collision failure groups is: 
 
4
2 5 5 2 4 4
400
2 1 1 2 1 1
Collisionc
       
         
       
 
 
However, when 4k   there are additional critical combinations that result in Abort, so when 
calculating 4
Abortc  we subtract off the failure groups that result in Collision.   
 
Thruster failure combinations not shown here require a similar but increasingly complicated 
combinatorial argument.  The following table shows all the critical combinations for Abort and 
Collision for this configuration of thrusters. 
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Table 3: Thruster Critical Combinations 
 
Failures 
Total 
Combinations 
Abort Critical 
Combinations 
Collision Critical 
Combinations 
1 18 0 0 
2 153 121 0 
3 816 788 0 
4 3,060 2,648 400 
5 8,568 5,766 2,800 
6 18,564 8,864 9,700 
7 31,824 10,024 21,800 
8 43,758 8,498 35,260 
9 48,620 5,420 43,200 
10 43,758 2,573 41,185 
11 31,824 884 30,940 
12 18,564 208 18,356 
13 8,568 30 8,538 
14 3,060 2 3,058 
15 816 0 816 
16 153 0 153 
17 18 0 18 
18 1 0 1 
 
2.3.  Brute Force Failure Logic 
 
The combinatorial argument described above can be verified by Brute Force.  In the Brute Force 
method, every possible combination of failures is listed (2
18
 = 262,144 combinations in this case) and 
for each, logic is applied to determine whether the combination is critical.  For example, if there were 
three thrusters there would be 2
3
 = 8 possible combinations of failure.  Below, a one (1) represents 
failure and a zero (0) represents success.   
 
Figure 1: 2
3
 Brute Force Failure Combinations 
 
 
 
The figure below is a sample of 10 of the 2
18
 possible failure combinations.   
 
Figure 2: 2
18
 Brute Force Failure Combinations 
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The thrusters listed in the first row correspond to the configuration shown in Table 1.  For example, 
{D1T1, D1T2, D1T3, D1T4, D1T5} are the thrusters in quadrant 1.  If at least one thruster in a 
quadrant fails, the quadrant is considered failed.  For example, suppose there are eight thruster 
failures.  In the sample above, this occurs twice (rep 18,094 and rep 145,009).  The first time, all four 
quadrants fail and the result is Collision.  The second time, only three quadrants fail and the result is 
Abort.  The Abort and Collision results are counted for every instance of eight failures, and the result 
is 8,498 instances of Abort and 35,260 instances of Collision.  This matches the combinatorial output 
shown in Table 3.   
 
3.  USING GAMUT 
 
Once the critical combinations have been calculated, GAMUT is used to determine the common cause 
contribution of the thruster system to the end states Abort and Collision.  For more details on the 
Global Alpha Model equations and their implementation in the GAMUT model logic, see the 
GAMUT documentation [4]. 
 
Common cause models require the assumption of either a staggered or a non-staggered system.  In a 
staggered system, individual units can be tested and replaced as needed.  In a non-staggered system, 
the items are installed and operated as a group; individual units cannot be isolated from the system and 
tested.  ISS Visiting Vehicle thrusters are assumed to be non-staggered systems because there is no 
testing or replacement of individual units.  ISS Visiting Vehicle thrusters are also assumed to operate 
on demand. 
 
GAMUT requires the inputs shown below.  For the ISS Visiting Vehicles, LOM = Abort and LOC = 
Collision.  The group size is 18 and the results will be used for Abort.  The minimum number of 
failures that can result in Abort is two.  The Visiting Vehicle thrusters are a non-staggered system and 
operate on demand.   
 
Figure 3: GAMUT inputs 
 
 
 
After GAMUT is run, column kc  contains the number of critical combinations for each group of size 
k .  GAMUT assumes that every group of a certain size is critical.  For example, when 2k  , 
GAMUT calculates 2
18
153
2
Abortc
 
  
 
.  But in the Visiting Vehicle thruster case, not all failure 
groups of a certain size are critical.  A group of two failures is only critical if the failures occur in 
different quadrants, and so in the thruster case 2 121
Abortc   as calculated in Section 2.2.  So after 
running GAMUT, replace the column containing values for kc  with the numbers of “Abort Critical 
Combinations” given in Table 3.  It is important that GAMUT is not run again after replacing these 
values, because this would overwrite the manually entered values for kc .    
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Figure 4: Entering the Critical Combinations 
 
 
 
4.  GAMUT RESULTS 
 
The results shown below represent the common cause contribution of this ISS Visiting Vehicle 
thruster system to the end state Abort.  The common cause event in SAPHIRE should have a Beta 
distribution, and the values required by SAPHIRE are the Mean and Beta Parameter b.  The common 
cause event needs to be multiplied by the independent failure probability in SAPHIRE using a 
compound event.  The reader is directed to the document “Implementing a Global Alpha Common 
Cause Model in SAPHIRE” [5] for more details on how to correctly model a global alpha common 
cause model in SAPHIRE.   
Figure 5: GAMUT Results 
 
 
 
Below are the GAMUT results for Abort and Collision for the given thruster configuration.   
 
Table 4: Global Alpha Model Results 
 
End State Mean Beta Parameter b 
Abort 2.9E-01 11 
Collision 5.5E-02 28 
 
That is, 29% of all independent thruster failures are expected to be part of a common cause group that 
will result in system Abort.    
k
System 
Status
ck ak Var(ak)
Q(m)k 
Mean
Q(m)k 
Variance
1 OK 0.0E+00 1.0E+00 9.8E-01 6.2E-05 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
2 LOM 1.2E+02 1.7E+01 9.7E-03 2.9E-05 1.3E-01 5.3E-03
3 LOM 7.9E+02 1.4E+02 5.3E-03 1.4E-05 8.7E-02 3.8E-03
4 LOM 2.6E+03 6.8E+02 2.9E-03 9.2E-06 4.3E-02 2.0E-03
5 LOM 5.8E+03 2.4E+03 1.6E-03 6.2E-06 1.9E-02 8.1E-04
6 LOM 8.9E+03 6.2E+03 9.3E-04 3.2E-06 7.5E-03 2.1E-04
7 LOM 1.0E+04 1.2E+04 5.5E-04 1.1E-06 2.9E-03 3.2E-05
8 LOM 8.5E+03 1.9E+04 3.4E-04 3.5E-07 1.1E-03 3.8E-06
9 LOM 5.4E+03 2.4E+04 2.3E-04 6.8E-07 4.3E-04 2.4E-06
10 LOM 2.6E+03 2.4E+04 1.7E-04 5.0E-07 1.7E-04 5.0E-07
11 LOM 8.8E+02 1.9E+04 1.3E-04 4.0E-07 6.3E-05 8.9E-08
12 LOM 2.1E+02 1.2E+04 1.2E-04 3.5E-07 2.2E-05 1.3E-08
13 LOM 3.0E+01 6.2E+03 1.1E-04 3.2E-07 6.3E-06 1.1E-09
14 LOM 2.0E+00 2.4E+03 1.0E-04 3.0E-07 1.1E-06 3.7E-11
15 OK 0.0E+00 6.8E+02 9.8E-05 2.9E-07 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
16 OK 0.0E+00 1.4E+02 9.6E-05 2.9E-07 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
17 OK 0.0E+00 1.7E+01 9.5E-05 2.9E-07 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
18 OK 0.0E+00 1.0E+00 9.5E-05 2.9E-07 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
1
1
m
k
 
 
 
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5.  MODEL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Common cause failures of the ISS Visiting Vehicle thrusters were previously modeled using a Beta 
Model, also described in NUREG/CR-5485 [1].  The Beta Model is easy to implement and is usually 
the default common cause model.  It cannot, however, be used to assess the likelihood of Abort.  The 
Beta Model assumes that any common cause failure results in the failure of every member of the 
group, and hence all outcomes of a Beta Model will necessarily result in Collision.  The beta value that 
was used for common cause failures of Visiting Vehicle thrusters was   1.1E-01.  That is, 11% of 
the time that a failure occurs, every item in the population fails.  This generic beta screening value was 
originally believed to be conservative.   
 
However, the ISS Visiting Vehicle thrusters have some unique properties.  They comprise a very large 
group that can fail with as few as two failures.  When 2k  , there are 
18
2
 
 
 
153 possible 
combinations of two failures, of which 121 are critical (resulting in Abort).  In the Global Alpha 
Model, given a failure, the fraction of failures that result in a group of size 2k   is ka  9.7E-03, a 
value extrapolated from the 2009 version of NUREG/CR-5496 [3].  The fraction of failures that are 
groups of size 2k   in a group of size 18 is ( )m
kQ  1.3E-01.  This is already larger than the screening 
value of   1.1E-01, and is only for a group of size two; the end result includes common cause 
failure groups of all sizes.   
 
When modeling common cause failures of ISS Visiting Vehicle thrusters, the Beta Model gives a 
lower result than the Global Alpha Model.  This might seem counterintuitive.  The Beta Model 
implicitly assumes alpha parameters for all failure group sizes, and like the Global Alpha Model it 
yields a single, global common cause value.  Apparently, the implied alpha parameters used by the 
Beta Model are lower than the generic NUREG values used in this study.  However, for more typical 
common cause models with a smaller number of components, the Beta Model might be appropriate for 
Collision considerations. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
 
The methodology described here has been used to model common cause of thrusters and valves on all 
the ISS Visiting Vehicles, including Shuttle, as well as common cause failures of Russian Service 
Module (SM) thrusters, Beta Gimbal Assemblies (BGAs), the Low-Impact Docking System (LIDS), 
and power feeds to the Multipurpose Laboratory Module (MLM) and Functional Cargo Block (FGB).  
It is the recommended common cause methodology for any system with a large number of similar 
redundant components, particularly when specific failure combinations are required to fail the system, 
as it provides a comprehensive and representative calculation of the likelihood of specific common 
cause failure combinations. 
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